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Abstract 
Th is paper presents some conceptual observations on how the condition of poverty 
is brought to public attention and discussed, i.e. on mediations of poverty. It is 
proposed that such mediation is largely monopolised by those who are not-poor, 
though attempts to describe the not-poor as a category call for circumspection. As 
such, mediations are based on preconceptions which are seldom examined carefully. 
Th ese preconceptions are dubbed phenomenal bases here, and three are outlined 
in general terms: poverty as experience, visible poverty, and poverty in abstract. A 
fi nal section considers ‘fear of poverty’ as a pervasive idea, and speculates on the 
possibility of approaching political economy accordingly. 
Keywords: poverty studies, metaphors, suff ering, gaze, precarity. 
Resumo
Este artigo apresenta algumas observações 
conceituais sobre como a condição de po-
breza é trazida para a atenção do público 
e discutida, ou seja, sobre mediações da 
pobreza. Propõe-se que tal mediação é 
em grande medida monopolizada por 
aqueles que não são pobres, embora as 
tentativas de descrever os não-pobres me-
reçam cuidadosa consideração. Como 
tais, as mediações baseiam-se em pressu-
posições que raramente são examinadas 
com atenção. Neste texto, são denomi-
nadas bases fenomenais, e três delas são 
delineadas em termos gerais: a pobreza 
como uma experiência, a pobreza visível, 
e a pobreza em abstrato. Uma seção fi nal 
examina o “medo da pobreza” como uma 
Resumen
Este artículo presenta algunas observacio-
nes conceptuales sobre cómo la condición 
de pobreza atrae la atención pública y 
cómo se discute; es decir, trata sobre las 
mediaciones de la pobreza. Se propone 
que tal mediación está en gran medida 
monopolizada por los no pobres, aun 
cuando la intención de describir los no-
-pobres merezca una cuidadosa consi-
deración. Las mediaciones, como tal, se 
basan en presuposiciones que raramente 
son examinadas con atención. En este 
texto se denominan conceptos básicos 
fenomenales y se describen tres de manera 
general: la pobreza como experiencia, la 
pobreza visible y la pobreza en abstracto. 
Una sección fi nal examina el “miedo a la 
Diagramação e XML SciELO Publishing Schema: www.editoraletra1.com.br | letra1@editoraletra1.com.br
ALEA | Rio de Janeiro | vol. 21/3 | p. 197-209 | set-dez. 2019198 SUMAN GUPTA | On the cusp...
ideia abrangente, e especula a respeito 
da possibilidade de abordar a economia 
política em tais bases. 
Palavras-chave: estudos da pobreza, 
metáfora, sofrimento, olhar, 
precariedade.
pobreza” como una idea generalizada y se 
especula sobre la posibilidad de abordar 
la economía política sobre tales bases. 
Palabras-clave: estudios de la pobreza, 
metáfora, sufrimiento, mirada, 
precariedad. 
Forming the Idea
The mediation of poverty bears upon perceptions, definitions, 
descriptions, measurements, tabulations, representations, analyses of poverty, 
and upon programmes for poverty alleviation. Insofar as all these entail some 
sort of recording for public or social engagement, that is done predominantly 
– overwhelmingly – from outside the precincts of living in poverty. Those who 
are not living in poverty, the not-poor, have a near monopoly on choosing to 
see the poor as such, on talking about them, and, occasionally, on enabling 
them to be heard. However, the not-poor are far from being an undivided 
and conflict-free constituency, and the boundary between not-poor and poor 
is not at all distinct or definite. My use of the terms ‘not-poor’ and ‘poor’ 
as counterpoints here is not meant to designate stable and adversarial social 
identities. The contrapuntal terms are momentarily convenient to articulate 
the notion of mediation and to set forth an argument. As the argument 
develops and acquires wider resonances, hopefully beyond the scope of this 
article, the counterpoint becomes indistinct. 
It seems currently meaningful to associate ‘mediation’ with the ‘media’, 
i.e. with the means of mediation: text, image, performance accessed in recorded, 
printed, exhibited, broadcast, digitalised forms. However, ‘mediation’ is used 
here with a somewhat different emphasis. The focus of this article is not on 
what the means of mediation enable but on what happens before and while the 
means of mediation are used despite their material character. The contention is 
that mediation involves something that is integral to that which is mediated 
and not simply derived from the means of mediation. The means of mediation 
are very largely owned and deployed by the not-poor with reference to the 
poor, and this circumstance bears upon mediation despite the material 
characteristics of particular means of mediation. The means of mediation do 
not in themselves determine what is mediated and to what purpose.
In brief, poverty is the other of those who undertake the mediation 
of poverty for public and social purposes. This otherness is imbued in how 
poverty is thought about and addressed for those purposes. 
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Most recent studies of poverty consist in two broad moves: first, 
recognising that poverty exists and registering its prevalence; second, proposing 
ways of dealing with or learning from the social evidence of poverty. The second 
move usually involves ideological subscriptions and ethical commitments, 
typically those of the not-poor and their agencies (the government, the political 
party, the charitable or activist organisation, the religious order, the lobby 
group, the academic forum). The first move is often quickly glossed over so 
that attention can be concentrated on the second. This article is concerned 
with the first move. It is averred here that what the second move consists in 
necessarily depends on how the first is made, and, somewhat circularly, the 
direction of the first move may be tacitly predetermined through anticipation 
of the second. Both moves embed the dominant ideology and ethics of the 
not-poor by mediating poverty as their other. Those ideological subscriptions 
and ethical commitments can therefore only be gauged by being put into 
perspective, i.e. by the not-poor being as upfront as possible about what’s 
involved anterior to the mediation of poverty. A pause on what’s involved in 
approaching poverty seriously and purposefully is called for. 
I do not therefore start with a statement of ideological and ethical 
principles. Nor do I begin by presenting received definitions and statistics, and 
then moving on to analysing causes and proposing solutions. Those are the 
substance of a prevailing mainstream of Poverty Studies. Under the rubric of 
Poverty Studies, particular socio-economic methods, which are usually referred 
to a canon of key specialists and theories, structure all contemplation of the 
phenomenon (for accessible overviews see Lister 2004; Haughton; Khandker, 
2009; Ravallion, 2017). As such, ‘poverty’ is understood immediately as a 
cohesive phenomenon or condition which calls for precise definition, numerate 
methods of measurement, data collection in specific contexts, and ultimately 
the determination thereby of the causes of and strategies for alleviating poverty. 
The obviously distinct connotations of ‘inequality’ are subject to a like scholarly 
approach, and often feature alongside or at least within the ambit of Poverty 
Studies. Particular social factors – inadequate nutrition, housing, income, 
education, health care, security, etc. and the attendant distresses – appear as 
symptoms of a precedent malaise, ‘poverty’ or ‘inequality’, which needs to be 
tracked to its roots. Differing definitions and methods to study both ‘poverty’ 
and ‘inequality’ are then subscribed, all of which are variously contested or 
championed. Amidst differences, however, the disciplinary territory is fairly 
rigidly structured and territorialised. Investigative methods associated with 
text analysis, linguistics, philosophy, history, anthropology and so on have 
a conditional purchase in the academic study of ‘poverty’, and appear as 
ancillary to this core structure of Poverty Studies.
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There is a narrow but crucial space at the anterior of that core structure 
which has received relatively little attention in an otherwise prolifically studied 
area. A sketchy effort is made below to give a structure to that space, to put 
some markers there. The mediations that enable, construct, complicate, 
engage with and, also, at times, elide or erase poverty are anticipated in this 
space. Our understanding of the condition of poverty, and thereby of the 
social world we live in, may be sharpened to some degree by focusing on it. 
In brief, the issue here is how the idea of poverty is formed. As Gertrude 
Himmelfarb (1984) had observed, with 1750-1850 England in mind: ‘to 
address oneself to the “idea” of poverty in this sense, is not to belittle either 
the problem of poverty or the policies designed to ameliorate it. It is rather 
an effort to elucidate both by adding another dimension to the social reality’ 
(p. 8).
Phenomenal Bases
To maintain a reasonably firm grip on the key issue – poverty -- amidst 
the different linguistic, cultural and ideological contexts through which 
it is refracted and wherein it is engaged, it is necessary to introduce some 
phenomenal bases for apprehending poverty. That is to say, some grasp of the 
essential means through which poverty rises to awareness as a phenomenon 
is needed. The relations of poverty qua poverty between different mediations 
in specific contexts are meaningfully discerned if we can constantly ground 
observations in terms of such phenomenal bases. Equally, those bases could 
then be nuanced and complicated according to the kinds of context-specific 
mediations in view, perhaps even to the extent of becoming transformed in the 
process. Here the phenomenal bases for apprehending poverty are presented 
without the burden of real-world documentation, mainly through situations 
which can be readily envisaged, and with a skeletal theoretical apparatus. 
I have in mind formulations which may be regarded as prolegomena for 
informing analysis of empirically grounded exploration, or at the least for 
testing in terms of such exploration. 
Three bases are thus outlined below: poverty as experience, visible 
poverty, poverty in abstract. 
Poverty as Experience
‘Experiencing poverty’, a standard phrase now, comes with the sense 
of a visceral awareness registered at a preconceptual level. It occurs within 
the self of the person in poverty. I have in mind the word ‘preconceptual’ in 
much the way Eugene Gendlin (1962) used it in his philosophical exposition 
of how meanings are formed in relation to experience. His description of 
‘preconceptual experience’ is useful: 
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I use the word ‘experiencing’ to denote concrete experience, because the 
phenomenon I refer to is the raw, present, ongoing functioning (in us) of 
what is usually called experience. Let me describe it:
It is something so simple, so easily available to every person, that at first its 
very simplicity makes it hard to point to. Another term for it is ‘felt meaning,’ 
or ‘feeling.’ However, ‘feeling’ is a word usually used for specific contents – for 
this or that feeling, emotion, or tone, for feeling good, or bad, or blue, or 
pretty fair. But regardless of the many changes in what we feel – that is to say, 
really, how we feel – there always is the concretely present flow of feeling. At 
any moment we can individually and privately direct our attention inward, 
and when we do that, there it is. Of course, we have this or that specific idea, 
wish, emotion, perception, word, or thought, but we always have concrete 
feeling, an inward sensing whose nature is broader. It is a concrete mass in 
the sense that it is ‘there’ for us. It is not at all vague in its being there. (p.11, 
emphases in the original)
If  X is a 35-year-old woman who feels persistently hungry, cold, exposed 
and unsafe, dirty, ill, troubled by her child’s demands for food, afraid of what’s 
to come and unable to do anything about these discomforts, X is undergoing 
a fundamentally visceral and felt experience – one of, let’s say, preconceptual 
suffering: concrete, raw, a really present flow of feeling distressed (to build 
upon Gendlin’s description). Though one or the other feeling might be the 
stronger, it is the combined experience of a number of them that is material 
here. If she states this lived experience as of ‘being poor’ or if someone else 
says she is experiencing ‘being in poverty’ then the concretely present flow 
of suffering has been given a structure, or given meaning in a communicable 
sense. As soon as that term – ‘being poor’, ‘in poverty’ – is attributed to her 
experience it opens up to a network of potential mediations. 
Actually, it might be impossible to say that her experience of suffering 
preceded its signification as ‘being in poverty’. Gendlin’s description of a 
preconceptual experience is after all an abstraction, a distinction made 
for philosophical clarity. In reality, experience and meaning are perhaps 
so inconceivably entwined that they are difficult to pull apart. However, 
apprehensions of poverty do come with a powerful conviction in the 
phenomenological and pre-articulated experience of suffering, even in ordinary 
language. 
In signifying X’s experience as that of being ‘in poverty’, some 
qualifications are immediately introduced. These qualifications are not 
‘preconceptual’ in Gendlin’s sense, they are already reasonably conceived. 
The very naming of ‘poverty’ as such is an act of conceptualising and already 
involves mediation in the sense outlined above. So, every qualification that 
follows is implicated in mediations that exist already. For this article, these 
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qualifications are stated as imbued in the phenomenal basis of experiencing 
poverty; the intent of the mediations are not of moment here. 
For the purposes of this argument, X is unlikely to understand her 
experiencing poverty as principally due to physical constraint. She is not 
suffering thus because she is literally enslaved or imprisoned. In that case, 
she would have considered her suffering as distinctively that of ‘being in 
slavery’ or ‘being a prisoner’. ‘Being in poverty’ might evoke enslavement or 
imprisonment as metaphors after the fact – ‘trapped in poverty’, ‘prisoner 
of poverty’. But the phenomenal experience itself is of felt circumstances 
(‘straitened circumstances’, the ‘condition of life’) rather than of actual 
incarceration. Further, X might blame specific persons for her suffering – 
perhaps the boss who made her redundant or the breadwinning partner who 
abandoned her – but she nevertheless experiences poverty as a condition that 
is not defined wholly by them, that has a wider import and effect. This is a 
baseline for the spatial dimension of experiencing poverty. 
X’s experiencing poverty is likely to be shaped by time, usually qualified 
by metaphors – let’s italicise them. If she had an affluent childhood her current 
suffering would be all the more bitter; but not as painful as it would be if she 
has only recently fallen or descended into poverty. However, if she has lived in 
poverty for long, was perhaps born into poverty, her experience would be of 
one who is hardened to suffering, and her senses might be deadened or numbed. 
X’s experiencing poverty is inevitably shaped by her connection to other 
persons. That’s what makes the very experience of poverty an immediately 
social matter. Metaphors abound in the expression of these connections 
too, but I will stop marking them. X’s suffering is the sharper because she 
feels responsible for her child’s suffering (feels family responsibilities). X’s 
experience would be coloured accordingly if she knew of neighbours around 
her having similar experiences. It might be reassuring to be able to share 
their mutual hardship, or she might regret being confined amongst them. 
She might be scornful of those over whom she has some slight advantage, or 
jealous of those who have some marginal advantage over her. X’s experience 
may be tinted with the attitude of those who are significantly better off, by 
their scorn or their compassion or indifference. She might try hard to hide 
her suffering and keep up appearances. She might actively plead for pity. 
She might feel humiliated or demeaned; she might stand on her dignity and 
pride; she might debase herself or feel debased. 
Visible Poverty
Poverty is sometimes visible to the not-poor, as a sensory encounter 
with a collective condition. In some contexts, poverty can be seen thus as 
concentrated in an impoverished zone or locality, visually marked by obvious 
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lack of amenities, poor upkeep of structures and neglected infrastructure, 
makeshift or small housing, the appearance of ill-kempt persons, etc. In 
other contexts, the visibility of poverty may be dispersed and fleeting, such 
as in encountering groups of homeless persons or beggars amidst otherwise 
well-maintained environs. The starkness of visible poverty is dependent on 
the extent to which the not-poor gaze is accustomed to such sights. The 
not-poor may sometimes see and recognise but not feel disturbed by such 
sights of poverty and at others encounter them with dismay or distaste. The 
frequency of visual encounter and the intensity of the appearance of poverty 
allow gradations to be made in visible poverty. Visual contrasts may also render 
the visibility of poverty more or less stark to the not-poor gaze: by a sharp 
visual juxtaposition of affluence and poverty, the degree of obvious suffering 
(especially physically borne, visible symptoms of disease and wounds), or the 
unexpectedness with which the sight is encountered. Whatever the contexts 
and circumstances, the quality of poverty as visible – recognised as visible – 
derives from the gaze that is extended by the not-poor. Visible poverty in this 
sense is constituted by its remoteness from the not-poor’s home environment, 
where the not-poor’s everyday lived experience is grounded, where the visual 
field is familiarly accepted. 
The visibility of poverty is likely to be evident to those who live in 
poverty, within that collective condition. This may bear a cursory resemblance 
to that which is registered in the gaze of the not-poor, especially for those 
who have fallen into poverty recently or have a contrasting past life or whose 
relations with others encompass the not-poor. But the poverty-stricken person’s 
encounter with visible poverty is nevertheless a qualitatively different one 
from that of the not-poor’s. It is unlikely to be a distinctive experience, and 
would most likely be an aspect within the phenomenal experience of being 
poor, accentuating and drowning into the various aspects of suffering which 
constitute that experience. 
The individual encounter of the not-poor person and the poverty-
stricken person, such that the latter is seen as embodying poverty, has a 
particular salience in the visibility of collective poverty. This could be within 
the collective setting of visible poverty, such as the not-poor person looking 
upon unkempt persons in a poor locality, or the not-poor casting a look at a 
group of homeless people in the subway. But it could also be in the not-poor 
person looking at a poor person with recognition of the latter’s condition 
as poverty-stricken. This is especially where personal acquaintance does not 
interfere with the look, where the look registers the poverty of the latter as a 
characteristic of the person. Here the not-poor gaze on the poor individual 
does not disavow the latter’s individuality but nevertheless and predominantly 
imbues it with a collectivised significance. With some adjustments, Jean-Paul 
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Sartre’s (1956 [1943]) description of the importance of the look in grasping 
self and other could help to clarify this point. 
So, Sartre imagines himself looking at a man in the park, at some 
distance. This look is immediately of one person – I (the subject) – registering 
another person as an object (like other objects, the tree, the bench and so on). 
At the same time I register that this other person may possibly be a person like 
me. But, despite appearances, the person I see may just possibly turn out to be 
utterly different from me. He might, for instance, be a robot. Then our paths 
cross and we exchange a look -- Sartre pins this moment down as essential 
to our mutual recognition of being persons and of being in the same world: 
‘my apprehension of the Other in the world as probably being a man refers 
to my permanent possibility of being-seen-by-him; that is, to the permanent 
possibility that a subject who sees me may be substituted for the object seen 
by me. “Being-seen-by-the-Other” is the truth of “seeing-the-Other”’ (p.345). 
But, to extend this Sartrean moment in an untoward direction, perhaps this 
moment of exchanging a look would not be confirmatory as Sartre anticipated. 
Perhaps the other person’s look registers as not substitutable with mine, but more 
like, in fact, a robot’s look – the lens, as it were, of an indifferent automaton 
walking by. That is, the Other’s look may be received not as that of a subject 
like me but more as that of an object unlike me, which is indifferent to me 
and towards which I feel something less than consanguinity. Perversely, in our 
exchange of looks I find only an object of whose humanity I am unconvinced, 
though in every respect the evidence is to the contrary. Insofar as the poor 
person is recognised by the not-poor as embodying poverty, the poor person is 
in the position of being exposed to such a gaze. The poor individual appears 
as the personified surface for an invisible collective mechanism behind it – 
the mechanism which generates poverty as a condition, the collective and 
discrete world of poverty, which is only circumstantially individualised and 
made visible in the drab dirty vest, the sores, the matted hair and beard, the 
hungry look, the diffident or defiant bearing. This not-poor gaze Others the 
poor, not so much as an individual who is much like and yet not me, but as 
a collective phenomenon to which my individuality cannot relate. Of course, 
the potential for that to flip is always there. Perhaps the not-poor person will 
after all recognise the poor person as substitutable with himself, and then the 
visibility of poverty will gradually become translucent and then drop away in 
the encounter of two subjects looking at each other. 
How the poverty-stricken person receives this look, and makes such 
looks part of his phenomenal experience of suffering, can also be woven 
into Sartre’s following arguments – especially in relation to shame at the 
compromising look and of being enslaved among others by looks which 
do not recognise the subject’s freedom. At present, however, the idea is to 
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present the phenomenal base of visible poverty to a necessary extent, so these 
Sartrean illustrations need not be taken further. 
Poverty in Abstract
The apprehension of poverty is always built upon the phenomenal bases 
of experiencing poverty and/or encountering visible poverty. But in building 
upon such bases, our grasp of poverty may obtain features that are grounded 
neither in experiencing poverty nor in visible poverty. These features could 
then be considered another kind of phenomenal base: poverty in abstract. 
Understanding poverty in abstract necessarily involves complex processes 
and factors – inferential methods, social convictions and ideological systems. 
But we do not need to immediately disaggregate those to be able to describe 
poverty in abstract, which is akin to and yet distinct from experiencing 
poverty and encountering visible poverty. 
Attributing the condition of poverty with a general normative character 
is a familiar form of approaching poverty in abstract. Sentiments such as 
‘the poor are trustworthy’ or ‘the poor are dishonest’, ‘poverty makes people 
self-denying’ or ‘poverty leads to dissolute behaviour’, ‘the poor are thrifty’ or 
‘the poor are reckless’, ‘the poor are tolerant’ or ‘poverty nurtures prejudice’, 
‘the poor are submissive’ or ‘poverty breeds violent resentments’, ‘poverty 
strengthens the character’ or ‘poverty destroys the soul’… are sometimes 
declared and acted upon as constitutive features of poverty. Religious 
tenets on voluntarily becoming poor (renouncing worldly goods, assuming 
ascetic lifestyles, etc.) and easing the suffering of the poor (giving alms, 
being charitable) are associated with normative characterizations of poverty. 
Most major world religions promote some such view of poverty in abstract. 
Normative characterizations are far from being the exclusive province of 
religious discourses. Political formations often offer moral ascriptions to the 
condition of poverty, and their agendas and policies are frequently premised 
on such ascriptions. If, for instance, policy were enacted on the grounds 
that ‘those who are poor largely deserve to be poor’ or ‘those who are poor 
deserve better’ then moral ascriptions are at play. Such attributions of general 
normative features to poverty have a tenuous connection to phenomenal 
experiences or visible evidences, but they play a considerable part alongside 
those in articulations of poverty (Galston and Hoffenberg eds. 2010 gives a 
reasonable overview of this area). 
The most effective and pervasive way of understanding poverty in 
abstract now is undoubtedly in terms of quantitative scales and intensities: 
by measurements of poverty or its symptoms, or via reckonings of inequality. 
It is almost impossible now to start talking about poverty without some 
statistical figures in view, which accentuate lived experiences and the perceived 
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visibility of poverty without being inferable from either. The reality of poverty 
is often considered to be grasped more firmly through measurement than 
by the other phenomenal bases. At times, measurements seem to constitute 
poverty irrespective of actual experience and perception, and in themselves 
render poverty recognisable, trackable, and discussable. How measurements 
influence thinking about poverty is a vast area and outside the scope of this 
article, but, as a phenomenal base, a couple of brief points on this are worth 
noting. On the one hand, measurements offer a way of, so to speak, placing 
the phenomenon of poverty in the social world. In that sense, these bring the 
extent of poverty, the weightiness of the phenomenon, into view. Where the 
visibility of poverty is fleeting or shrouded, measurements reveal its presence; 
where the visibility of poverty is unavoidable, measurements find the limits of 
the view; where the suffering of poverty is attested, the testimony is confirmed 
or doubted by relevant measurements. On the other hand, measurements also 
enable the management of poverty, leading into answering questions such 
as: How to make poverty less visible? How to allay the suffering of poverty? 
What should the poor do and what should the not-poor do?... That is, with 
measurements in hand attention can be turned towards how to change those 
measurements and how to measure that change. 
Fear of Poverty
Fear of poverty is, arguably, a key component of almost all mediations, 
so an account of what that means here is expedient. In fact, fear of poverty 
might well be imbued in the very step of recognising and naming poverty, 
an aspect of the idea of poverty itself. Fear of poverty is understood here as 
a continuum that stretches in variegated ways from the experience of those 
in poverty to the anticipations of the not-poor. 
The experience of being in poverty is not of uniform and ongoing 
suffering. There might be more or less transient reprieves, ups and downs, turns 
of mood, changes for the better or worse. Perhaps more than the phenomenal 
experience of suffering, the fear that things might imminently become worse, 
even more suffering might be around the corner, is an intrinsic element of 
experiencing poverty. X’s experience of poverty, as briefly described above, 
might in its depths still anticipate further depths: her child might die of 
starvation, her illness might become more debilitating, she might be evicted 
from her room and so on. On the other hand, she might unexpectedly be given 
some money, she might finally find that job she was looking for, the weather 
might change for the better, she might simply awake feeling optimistic and 
so on. And then, her fear of even greater poverty would still mark a horizon 
within her experience of poverty. She might decide to enjoy this moment, eat 
up what she found, spend what she has, before that dreaded descent continues 
ALEA | Rio de Janeiro | vol. 21/3 | p. 197-209 | set-dez. 2019
Diagramação e XML SciELO Publishing Schema: www.editoraletra1.com.br | letra1@editoraletra1.com.br
207SUMAN GUPTA | On the cusp...
– to make the momentary reprieve a holiday. Or she might ration the food 
she has found, the money she is now earning, the support she has discovered, 
and make another effort to stave off a final doom. Within such shades of 
experiencing suffering there is perhaps an unimaginable final moment which 
is constantly anticipated and constantly – just about – deferred. It is difficult 
to put a definition to this final moment. This sense of dreaded anticipation 
and deferred imminence of suffering seems to be captured in recent reflections 
on ‘precarious’ existence, conditions of ‘precarity’ – such as Judith Butler’s 
(2004) and Isabelle Lorey’s (2015 [2012]). The final moment or horizon 
that is conceived in such reflections is usually that of life, the unnatural end 
of life. This allows for ‘precarity’ to be generalised across a wide range of 
socially fraught circumstances – including wars and other political conflicts, 
coercive government, exposure to destructive natural events. But insofar as 
the experience of poverty anticipates and struggles against a final moment 
(insofar, that is, as precarity is peculiar to poverty) the looming final point 
is probably not death in itself but an unbearable vertex of suffering from 
which there is no return and which can barely be imagined. The experience 
of poverty seems an inevitable leaning towards this vertex so that its finality 
can be felt and yet without a final precipitation. 
For the not-poor, fear of poverty is not so much an exacerbation of 
the condition of suffering that they are in already, teetering on the brink of 
a climax of unbearable suffering, but of possibly getting to such a condition. 
Another way of saying that is: for the poverty-stricken, the fear of greater 
or ultimate poverty is grasped in terms of their phenomenal experience of 
suffering, while for the not-poor it is grasped as becoming drawn into or 
integrated into what they see from a distance as visible poverty. But this too 
has some grounding in the not-poor’s own lives. Portents of poverty might 
appear as more or less imminent within their own lives, whereby the visibility 
of poverty might slip into their own experience near poverty. This might be 
because the not-poor’s job is insecure, debts are accumulating, liabilities are 
growing, the political regime is changing, etc.; or, to varying degrees, because 
wider premonitions of ‘risk’, ‘instability’, ‘inflation’, ‘depression’, etc. are in 
the air. Thus, it is not merely between the axes of experiencing poverty and 
seeing poverty that fear of poverty prevails amongst the not-poor. Poverty in 
abstract appears with a phenomenal bearing, laying out degrees of proximity 
from poverty, suggesting imminence or perhaps just the glimmering of a 
possibility which must be avoided at all costs. 
Proximity to the possibility of experiencing poverty, to becoming 
integrated into visible poverty, might seem the spur to the not-poor feeling 
afraid of poverty. But it is perhaps possible that fear of poverty has inroads 
into strata of the not-poor which are distant from such a possibility. That’s to 
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say, fear of poverty might well be a structuring feature of social and political 
orders, which bear upon all within it. Fear of poverty might be imbued into 
various aspects of normal social and economic life. It is arguable, for instance, 
that accumulation of capital is the obvious counter to the fear of poverty. 
Accumulation is generally regarded as the motive-force of capitalist economies 
and polities; by the same coin, fear of poverty may correspondingly also be a 
motive-force of economies and polities. There might be an inverse proportional 
relationship. Perhaps, there’s accumulation that is driven by fear of poverty, 
and then there is accumulation that has overcome fear of poverty, and beyond 
that there may be accumulation that is as overweening as the fear of poverty 
then appears an absurdity. Alternatively, capital accumulation might be a 
process of rationalising the distribution of the fear of poverty. There may 
be rationalised distributions such that this fear becomes absurd in pockets 
only to the extent that it is intensified and concretized in other pockets, or 
so that it is stoked among some to the extent that it is inconceivable for 
others, or so that its pressure is individualised or collectivised in systematic 
ways. In this sense, fear of poverty could be understood as distributed along a 
continuous line, from experiencing the suffering of being poor and anxieties of 
insecurity to feeling fortunate by contrast, compassionate and even perceiving 
opportunities for gaining something from all of those. If such a political 
economy of the fear of poverty is conceived, it is likely that it will be expressed 
– however tangentially – in the prevailing economic regime and become the 
mechanism for capitalization. In brief, fear of poverty could be thought of as 
having its complement in profit making on the back of poverty, as a feature of the 
prevailing regime. This hypothesis is, as all hypotheses are, offered tentatively 
in the first instance. It needs testing, but unless it is proposed the appropriate 
tests cannot be conceived and undertaken. 
In the spirit of prolegomena, however, these are excessively impressionistic 
and fleshless observations, more gestures towards arguments to come than 
immediately meaningful. 
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